No Transitional Justice Without Transition: Darfur - A Case Study by Kritz, Brian A. & Wilson, Jacqueline
NO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE WITHOUT 
TRANSITION: 
DARFUR – A CASE STUDY 
Brian A. Kritz* & Jacqueline Wilson† 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 476 
I.     BACKGROUND ..................................................................................... 476 
II.    INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SITUATION IN DARFUR .................... 481 
III. THE HYBRID COURT FOR CRIMES IN DARFUR ..................................... 488 
IV. TRADITIONAL MECHANISMS FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT AND 
         RECONCILIATION ................................................................................ 489 
V.    RECONCILIATION................................................................................. 493 
VI. REPARATIONS ...................................................................................... 495 
VII. POTENTIAL SHORTCOMINGS OF THE USE OF TRADITIONAL 
         MECHANISMS ...................................................................................... 497 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 498 
The Arabs and the government forces arrived on both sides of the village, 
with vehicles, on horseback and on camels, armed with big weapons.  I hid 
in order to see how many there were.  The Arabs cordoned off the village 
with more than 1,000 horses.  There was also a helicopter and an Antonov 
plane.  They shelled the town with more than 200 shells.  We counted 119 
persons who were killed by the shelling.  Then the Arabs burnt all our 
houses, took all the goods from the market.  A bulldozer destroyed houses.  
Cars belonging to the merchants were burnt and generators were stolen.  
They said they wanted to conquer the whole territory and that the Blacks 
did not have a right to remain in the region.  
– Testimony of a local chief in the Abu Gamra area (between Tina and 
Kornoy), describing the extent of the destruction in his village.1
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INTRODUCTION
Testimony such as that above has generated a global, committed, activist 
community; diplomatic initiatives; and talk of ending impunity through the 
use of international law.  This paper examines the response options for 
providing justice and accountability in Darfur as it transitions—hopefully—
from war to sustainable peace.  In light of the unique cultural and historical 
characteristics of the conflict examined in this Article as well as 
developments in international law, the Authors suggest that only a 
combination of international, national and local, and traditional mechanisms 
for accountability can bring true peace to the people of Darfur and the 
greater Sudan.  
I. BACKGROUND
Darfur, a large, isolated region of western Sudan, has sometimes been 
more closely identified with its geographical neighbors (such as Chad and 
Libya) than with the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, from which it is detached 
geographically, politically, economically, and emotionally.  Historically, 
even the British were unable to rule Darfur effectively from Khartoum, as 
evidenced in a letter from Sir Herbert Kitchener in a proclamation to the 
Sheikhs of Kordofan and Darfur in 1898: “I write to inform you that it is the 
intention of the Government to resume its authority in the countries of 
Kordofan, Darfur, and all the western Sudan; but for the moment I am 
occupied in organizing the Nile and the eastern Sudan . . . .”2  This 
“distance,” accompanied by political and economic disenfranchisement, has 
come to be referred to as “marginalization,” which continues to define 
Darfur until today. 
The demographics of Darfur are interesting to note, and are important to  
understanding the region.  The region of Darfur has encountered extensive 
demographic change over the past half-century.  The population has 
increased six-fold since 1973, from 1.3 million to 6.2 million.  Nearly half 
of this population, which is increasingly linked to Darfur’s urban centers, is 
between the ages of zero and sixteen.3  Conflict in the Darfur region has 
the Genocide Intervention Network, who provided significant research assistance in support 
of this article. 
 1. Amnesty Int’l, Sudan: Arming the Perpetrators of Grave Abuses in Darfur 
Testimonies, AI Index: AFR 54/144/2004 (Nov. 16, 2004) available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR54/144/2004/en/71d39083-fa9e-11dd-999c-
47605d4edc46/afr541442004en.pdf. 
 2. A.B. THEOBALD, ALI DINAR: LAST SULTAN OF DARFUR 31 (1965). 
 3. Rep. of the Office of the U.N. Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, U.N. 
Sudan, Beyond Emergency Relief: Longer-Term Trends and Priorities for UN Agencies in 
Darfur, 14-15 (Sept. 2010), available at www.unsudanig.org/docs/ 
Darfur_LT_100905_med.pdf; Political Map of the Republic of Sudan, NATIONS ONLINE 
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escalated the process of urbanization and destabilized agrarian communities, 
largely as a result of migratory flows.4  The ethnically diverse population 
boasts between forty and ninety ethnic tribes.5 Despite the region’s ethnic 
diversity, both the so-called “African” tribes—the Fur, the Tunjur, Meidob, 
and Zaghawa in the north, the Berti and Birgid to the east, and the Masalit 
to the west, among others—and the Arab tribes, are almost exclusively 
Muslim. 
Darfur is still largely a traditional region.  Cattle-herding and camel-
herding nomads or semi-pastoralists coexist with sedentary farmers much as 
they have for generations.  “Rural livelihoods in Darfur are relatively simple 
to understand, in that all tribes, Arab and non–Arab, cultivate crops and 
raise livestock to varying degrees.”6  There is no development to speak of 
outside of El Fashir, Nyala and Geneina, the capitals of North, South and 
West Darfur, respectively, with life largely unaffected by resources from 
Khartoum.  Even access to education has been extremely limited for 
Darfurians: 
“Entry to schools was very strictly controlled and largely limited to the 
sons of tribal chiefs,” P. Ingleson, the British Governor of Darfur from 
1934 to 1941, said at the time: “We have been able to limit education to 
the sons of chiefs and [N]ative [A]dministration personnel and can 
confidently look forward to keeping the ruling classes at the top of the 
education tree for many years to come.7
Other aspects of marginalization have included restricting access to 
health care, jobs, resources, and most importantly, political power; the latter 
a crucial factor in post-conflict justice and accountability.8
PROJECT, http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/sudan_map.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 
2011).   
 4. Id. at 15-16. 
 5. JULIE FLINT & ALEX DE WAAL, DARFUR: A NEW HISTORY OF A LONG WAR 6
(2008). 
 6. H. Young, A.M. Osman, et al., Darfur – Livelihoods Under Siege, FEINSTEIN 
INT’L FAMINE 2 (2005), available at https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/download/ 
attachments/14553452/Young--Darfur--Livelihoods+Under+Seige.pdf?version=1. 
 7. Id. at 19 (quoting M.W. DALY, IMPERIAL SUDAN: THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN 
CONDOMINIUM: 1934-1956 (1991)). 
 8. The installment of one group of proxy rulers drawn from the local population 
was a common mechanism for local control in European colonial history.  In Rwanda, the 
colonial powers established a myth about the Tutsi people’s superiority, in order to establish 
their right to rule the majority Hutu on behalf of the colonizers.  Similarly, in the Belgian 
Congo, King Leopold II used local groups to subdue and control other tribes in order to 
expand his control over the vast expanse of his colonial empire.  See Jessica Raper, The 
Gacaca Experiment: Rwanda’s Restorative Dispute Resolution Response to the 1994 
Genocide, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1 (2005) (providing a detailed account of such practices 
in Rwanda).  And, for the Belgian Congo, see A. HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD'S GHOST: A
STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA (1998).  Such divisive control 
mechanisms by Western colonial powers fostered later distrust of the Northern powers, and 
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This lack of access to political power for Darfurians was documented in 
the politically motivated publication, The Black Book: Imbalance of Power 
and Wealth in Sudan, published in 2000 by the anonymous “Seekers of 
Truth and Justice.”9  The book documents how Darfurians have been 
restricted from power in all its manifestations, from jobs, to distribution of 
resources, to the military hierarchy, which had all been kept a closely-
guarded commodity by a small, ruling northern elite.  Table 10 from The 
Black Book demonstrates the power restrictions described above:
Table 10: Constitutional / Ministerial Positions, July 1989-
December 1999.10
Region Positions %
Eastern 6 3% 
Northern 120 59.4% 
Central 18 8.9% 
Southern 30 14.9% 
Western 28 13.8% 
As the above table shows, representation of the Northern Region was 59 
percent for a group that constituted only 12.2% only.  As such, the destiny 
of the remaining 87.8% of the population was subordinate to the will of 
the 12.2% who came from the Northern region.  The Northern Region 
itself was not (still is not) a homogeneous entity.  In fact, the North 
contained many groups that were subject to same level injustice and 
marginalization . . . . In fact, the entire Northern Region was dominated by 
only three ethnic groups11 which also dominated the whole country.12
The current conflict in Darfur ostensibly stems from a joint Sudan 
Liberation Army (SLA) and Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) attack 
on April 25, 2003, in which they entered al-Fashir and attacked government 
also exacerbated the current tribal disputes that linger throughout post–colonial Africa.  This 
history of abuse and manipulation contributes to the African Union’s discomfort with the 
imposition of international justice mechanisms in Sudan. 
 9. The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan, Part 1
http://www.sudanjem.com/sudanalt/english/books/blackbook_part1/book_part1.asp.htm (last 
visited May 6, 2007) [hereinafter Black Book].  See William Wallis, The Black Book History 
or Darfur’s Darkest Chapter, SUDAN TRIB. (Aug. 21, 2004), http://www.sudantribune.com/ 
spip.php?article4868 (synopsizing The Black Book). 
 10. Id. at tbl. 10. 
 11. These three ethnic groups, the Shaygia, the Jaalyeen, and the Danagla, are groups  
from the Northern Region and constitute approximately five percent of the overall population 
of Sudan. 
 12. Black Book, supra note 9. 
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forces:13 “Seven hours later, four Antonov bombers and helicopter gunships 
were destroyed, by government account, and seven by the rebels.’  At least 
75 troops, pilots and technicians had been killed and another 32 captured, 
including the commander of the air base, Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Bushra 
Ismail.”14
However, history demonstrates that the conflict has much deeper roots.
An excerpt from a Human Rights Watch report from 2004 clarifies the 
background of the conflict:  
Beginning in the mid-1980s, when much of the Sahel region was hit by 
recurrent episodes of drought and increasing desertification, the southern 
migration of the Arab pastoralists provoked land disputes with agricultural 
communities.  These disputes generally started when the camels and cattle 
of Arab nomads trampled the fields of the non–Arab farmers living in the 
central and southern areas of Darfur.  Often the disputes were resolved 
through negotiation between traditional leaders on both sides, 
compensation for lost crops, and agreements on the timing and routes for 
the annual migration. 
In the late–1980s, however, clashes became progressively bloodier 
through the introduction of automatic weapons.  By 1987, many of the 
incidents involved not only the Arab tribes, but also Zaghawa pastoralists 
who tried to claim land from Fur farmers, and some Fur leaders were 
killed.  The increase in armed banditry in the region also dates from this 
period, partly because many pastoralists lost all their animals in the 
devastating drought in Darfur of 1984-1985 and, in turn, raided others to 
restock their herds.15
In response to the 2003 attacks, the government of Sudan mobilized and 
armed a proxy militia, called Janjaweed, to retaliate for this initial 
aggression.  The term Janjaweed requires some clarification: 
The label ‘Janjaweed’ is misleading, as it is used differently in Darfur 
according to tribal affiliation and political viewpoint.  The term is 
generally used to describe ‘additional armed forces,’ the militias mobilised 
by the government to address the counter-insurgency, whose methods and 
violations of human rights are infamous . . . in some circles of the 
international community, however, there is the wrong and dangerous 
 13. Greater details of the history of the conflict are available in J. Flint, Beyond 
‘Janjaweed’: Understanding the Militias of Darfur, 16 SMALL ARMS SURVEY (2009); A. de 
Waal, Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap, 31 REV. OF AFR. POL. ECON. 716, 723 (2004); and 
MAHMOOD MAMDANI, SAVIORS AND SURVIVORS: DARFUR, POLITICS AND THE WAR ON 
TERROR (2009). 
 14. MANDAMI, supra note 13, at 288. 
 15. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, REPORT 2004: DARFUR IN FLAMES: ATROCITIES IN 
WESTERN SUDAN 7 (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ 
sudan0404.pdf. 
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assumption that Janjaweed = Arabs = perpetrators of human rights 
violations.  Among pro-government groups, the term ‘Janjaweed’ is used 
to describe bandit gangs . . . who are considered to be criminals and 
outlaws, not under the authority or control of any tribe. The ‘additional 
armed forces,’ by contrast, are men mobilised by their tribes to receive 
military training, who are paid, and who come under the direct control of 
the government.16
Despite the confusion about the nature and role of the Janjaweed, the 
group’s attack methods are largely consistent with those used historically in 
Darfur.17  A reference to a 1900-1901 expedition against the Bani Halba 
tribe, states that “Ali Dinar (the last sultan of the Fur tribe in Darfur) has 
beaten the Bani Halba and plundered all their property.”18  In another 
example, “[t]he Shaikh of the Zaiadiya stated that 27 villages had been 
destroyed by fire; 90 men killed; 85 women and children and 70 slaves 
captured, together with 670 sheep, 250 cattle, 50 donkeys and 40 camels.”19
Despite this historical context, the current conflict differs from previous 
iterations of violence in Darfur in a number of ways.  First, the scale and 
scope of the conflict outpaces any previous violence by multiples.  A 2005 
 16. Young, supra note 6, at 23. 
 17. The “Janjaweed” label has been used, often indiscriminately, by media reports 
and advocacy organizations to describe the loose amalgam of militias armed and mobilized 
by the Sudanese government.  Alex de Waal describes the Janjaweed as an integral 
component of the Sudanese government’s “counter–insurgency on the cheap,” which 
allowed the Sudanese government to pursue a relatively inexpensive and unaccountable 
scorched–earth policy against Darfuri rebels, including the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM) and Sudan Liberation Army (SLA).  De Waal, supra note 13.  The recent Janjaweed
militias, however, are the latest incarnation of a strategy of militia warfare used consistently 
throughout the last several decades of civil conflict in Southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, 
and Darfur.  Flint, supra note 13, at 16.  Organized by Sheikh Musa Hilal Abdalla, a 
Mahamid Arab chief in North Darfur, the Janjaweed are closely affiliated with various 
paramilitary organizations under the command of the Sudanese regime, including the Popular 
Defense Forces (PDF), the Border Intelligence Guards, and the Central Police Reserve.  Id. at 
18.  The PDF began to recruit, train, and arm tribal militias in the aftermath of the April 25, 
2003 SLA-JEM attack on the El Fashir airport.  The integration of many tribal militias into 
the PDF command structure and Darfur’s various inter–tribal conflicts frequently obscured 
the identities of various paramilitary and tribal groups in the region, including the Janjaweed.
Jago Salmon, A Paramilitary Revolution: The Popular Defense Forces, 29 SMALL ARMS 
SURVEY (2007), available at http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SWP-10-
Paramilitary-Revolution.pdf. Sudanese military intelligence and National Congress Party 
officials coordinated cross-border Janjaweed mobilization with anti–Déby rebels in Chad, as 
well as Sudanese military’s counterinsurgency operations.  However, the organization of 
Janjaweed militias has shifted significantly as a result of a number of factors, including 
funding concerns (initially, counterinsurgents were compensated through booty, rather than 
consistent salaries), relations with the PDF, and relations with the Sudanese government in 
the aftermath of the ICC arrest warrants.  Flint, supra note 14, at 21.  The government forces’ 
control over the Janjaweed militias ebbed as the Darfur conflict continued, prompting 
significant intra–Arab land conflict.  Id. at 40. 
 18. THEOBALD, supra note 2, at 44.  
 19. Id. at 50. 
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study of the impact on livelihoods in Darfur found that “the non–Arab 
population of Darfur has lost between fifty percent and ninety percent of its 
livestock to the government’s armed forces.”20
Second, the commonly repeated misperception in much of the Western 
media frames the conflict as a religious or racial dispute.  As shown 
previously, the conflict has many roots: marginalization from resources and 
political power, unresolved solutions from drought–related conflict, and a 
tradition of revenge and retaliation for raids on villages and livestock, all of 
which were exacerbated by the government’s brutal response incorporating 
attacks on civilians as a strategy.  All of these root causes impact the 
feasibility and design of post-conflict justice and accountability 
mechanisms.  
International law has also changed since the time of previous conflicts in 
Darfur, so that genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and use of 
atrocities as methods of power and control are no longer acceptable.  
Beginning in earnest with the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials and following 
with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the UN–backed Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, the Ad-Hoc Court for East Timor, and the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia, the international legal community has made 
significant efforts to end the global culture of impunity.  State leaders have 
faced charges of human right violations committed while in office.21
Secondary leaders and organizers of administrative violence have also been 
brought to justice for violations of international human rights law and 
violations of domestic criminal law.  
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SITUATION IN DARFUR
The concept of an international criminal court was first introduced in UN 
General Assembly Resolution 95(I) in 1946.22  It took almost fifty–two 
years until July 17, 1998 to move the court from concept to reality with the 
creation of the Rome Statute of the ICC.23  Mindful of ex post facto
considerations,24 and the need for extensive State buy–in to the concept of 
an international court, the Rome Statute did not enter into force until sixty 
 20. Young, supra note 6, at 5.  
 21. State leaders who have faced charges include Prime Minister Jean Kambanda of 
Rwanda, President Slobodan Milošević of Serbia, President Hissène Habré of Chad, 
President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, and, most recently, President Alberto Fujimori of Peru. 
 22. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of 
the Nürnberg Tribunal, G.A. Res 1/95, U.N. Doc. A/Res 41/1 (Dec. 11, 1946).  
 23. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 24. Article 22, Section 1 of the Rome Statute sets forth the basic rule of nullem 
crimen sin lege: that no person may stand charge before the ICC for an act unless the act in 
question was a crime under the Rome Statute at the time of the commission of the act.  Id.
art. 22(1). 
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States joined the treaty regime, or more specifically, until “the first day of 
the month after the 60th day following the date of the deposit of the 60th 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.”25
The Rome Statute entered into force as per the above procedure on July 
1, 2002, after a ceremonial group ratification brought the total number of 
ratifications to sixty-six.26  The Rome Statute now enjoys 114 state-parties, 
including thirty African nations.27 The ICC’s establishment trumpets the 
fact that neither governments nor individuals can hide behind cover of state 
sovereignty when implementing actions that run counter to minimum 
standards of behavior set forth in international law.28  The Court has 
jurisdiction over four crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and the crime of aggression.29
Evidence of atrocities in Darfur leaked out to the world and made its way 
to the ICC, despite limitations due to the government of Sudan restricting 
access to the region. 
In many cases documented by Human Rights Watch, there was little to no 
rebel or armed presence in the targeted villages at the time of the attacks, 
and the attacks were clearly aimed at the civilian population.  Even in 
cases where there was a rebel presence, the Sudanese government’s attacks 
made no attempt to discriminate between combatants and civilians, or 
disproportionately harmed civilians beyond the expected military 
advantage of the attack, in violation of international humanitarian law.  
The rebel groups in Darfur are also responsible for serious abuses, 
including killings, rape and abductions of civilians, attacks on 
humanitarian convoys, and theft of livestock, that are war crimes.30
 25. Id. art. 126(1). 
 26. JOANNE LEE, INT’L CTR. FOR CRIMINAL LAW REFORM & CRIMINAL JUSTICE SOC’Y,
NINTH ICC PREPCOM: 8-19 APRIL 2002, UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK 7 (2002), 
http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/PrepcomreportApr02-gen2.PDF.  
 27. The State Parties to the Rome Statute, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC),
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/ (last visited March 12, 2009).  Sudan has 
signed, but has not ratified, the Rome Statute, and thus is considered a non–party to the 
statute. 
 28. See Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 1 (stating that the International Criminal 
Court “shall be a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction 
over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this 
Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”).
 29. The scope of the crime of aggression is still at issue, and was recently addressed 
at the Kampala Conference, which took place in June 2010. 
 30. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, REPORT 2005: ENTRENCHING IMPUNITY: GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN DARFUR 10 (2005), available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/darfur1205/darfur1205webwcover.pdf. 
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These and similar findings were confirmed in January 2005 with the 
publication of the Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, which stated:  
[b]ased on a thorough analysis of the information gathered in the course of 
its investigations, the Commission established that the Government of 
Sudan and the Janjaweed (a total of 51 individuals) were responsible for 
serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law 
amounting to crimes under international law and recommended that the 
Security Council refer the case to the ICC.31
Given evidence that atrocities which violated international humanitarian 
law had occurred in Darfur, the UN Security Council took up the case to 
determine what action, if any, was to be taken under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.  After a series of resolutions and reports,32 the Security Council, on 
March 31, 2005 passed UNSCR 1593, in which it “[d]ecide[d] to refer the 
situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the ICC.”33  In 
June 2005, the ICC Office of the Prosecutor announced that it was 
investigating the situation in Darfur for the purpose of determining whether 
crimes under the jurisdiction of the court had been committed.  In July 
2008, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICC filed three counts of genocide, five 
charges of crimes against humanity, and two counts of war crimes against 
President Bashir, and referred the case to the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC 
for review and the issuance of an arrest warrant under Article 58.34  On 
March 4, 2009, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued an arrest warrant for Bashir.  
The warrant included seven counts of crimes under the jurisdiction of the 
 31. Rep. of the Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary–General, established 
pursuant to resolution 1564 (2004) concerning reports of violations of international law in 
Darfur, 3, www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf  (Jan. 25, 2005). 
 32. See S.C. Pres. Statement 2004/18, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2004/18 (May 16, 2004); 
S.C. Res. 1547, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1547 (June 11, 2004); S.C. Res. 1556, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1556 (July 30, 2004); S.C. Res. 1590, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1590 (Mar. 24, 2005); S.C. 
Res. 1591, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1591 (Mar. 29, 2005). 
 33. After referral to the ICC, the UN did not cease its action regarding Darfur.  Since 
the passage of Resolution 1593, the Security Council followed up with at least eleven 
Presidential Statements as well as seven Security Council Resolutions.  See S.C. Res. 1593, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005); S.C. Res. 1627, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1627 (Sept. 23, 
2005); S.C. Res. 1663, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1663 (Mar. 24 2006); S.C. Res 1672, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1672 (Apr. 25, 2006); S.C. Res. 1679, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1679 (May 16, 2006); S.C. 
Res. 1706, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1706 (Aug. 31, 2006) (authorizing action under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations); S.C. Res. 1713, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1713 (Sept. 29, 2006); 
S.C. Res. 1714, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1714 (Oct. 6, 2006). 
 34. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Prosecutor’s Application for 
a Warrant of Arrest (July 14, 2008), http://www2.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/64FA6B33-05C3-
4E9C-A672-3FA2B58CB2C9/277758/ICCOTPSummary20081704ENG.pdf.  The court had 
earlier issued arrest warrants for Ahmed Haroun, the Sudanese Minister for Humanitarian 
Affairs, and Ali Kushayb, a Janjaweed militia leader. 
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court—five counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war 
crimes.  In a two-to-one decision, the court declined to issue an arrest 
warrant on the charges of genocide.  
The majority of the Chamber, Judge Anita Ušacka dissenting, found that 
the material provided by the Prosecution in support of its application for a 
warrant of arrest failed to provide reasonable grounds to believe that the 
Government of Sudan acted with specific intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups.  Consequently, the crime of 
genocide is not included in the (initial) warrant issued for the arrest of 
Omar Al Bashir.  Nevertheless, the Judges stressed that if additional 
evidence is gathered by the Prosecution, the decision would not prevent 
the Prosecution from requesting an amendment to the warrant of arrest in 
order to include the crime of genocide. 35
Immediately after its issuance, President Bashir rejected the validity of 
the arrest warrant and ordered most international aid workers to leave 
Sudan.36  The African Union objected to the issuance of the arrest warrant 
on the grounds that it might frustrate the ongoing peace efforts, noting that 
“its request to the UN Security Council to delay Mr. Bashir’s indictment 
had been ignored.”37  China, keenly interested in Sudanese oil imports and 
also a major exporter of arms and armaments to Sudan, called for a 
suspension of the arrest warrant in order to “further the peace process.”38
The Arab League rejected the arrest warrant outright.39
The prosecution subsequently appealed the court’s divided ruling 
described above, and requested an amendment to the warrant of arrest to 
include the crime of genocide.  On July 12, 2010, the ICC Appeals Chamber 
reconsidered the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision and allowed the addition of
three counts of genocide to the Court’s arrest warrant for President Bashir.  
The Appeals Chamber determined that there existed “reasonable grounds” 
to suggest that he had perpetrated attacks on the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa 
 35. Press Release, ICC Issues a Warrant of Arrest for Omar Al Bashir, President of 
Sudan, ICC Press Release ICC-CPI-20090304-PR394  (Mar. 4, 2009), available at
http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases
%20(2009)/icc%20issues%20a%20warrant%20of%20arrest%20for%20omar%20al%20bashi
r_%20president%20of%20sudan. 
 36. Sudan Orders Aid Agency Expulsions, CNN (Mar. 4, 2009), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/03/04/sudan.expel/. 
 37. Africa Move on Bashir Dismissed, BBC NEWS (July 5, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8134718.stm. 
 38. Igalliot, African Union to Call for Suspension of Bashir Arrest Warrant, FRANCE 
24 (June 3, 2009), http://www.france24.com/en/20090305-african-bashir-arrest-sudan-darfur-
ICC-au-agencies-aid-relief. 
 39. Arab League Rejects ICC Bashir Warrant, SUDAN WATCH (Apr. 1, 2009), 
http://sudanwatch.blogspot.com/2009/04/arab-league-rejects-icc-bashir-warrant.html. 
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ethnic groups in Darfur with the intent to destroy in part these civilian 
populations.40
The ICC’s reconsideration of genocide charges against President Bashir 
have proved controversial.  The U.S. State Department and National 
Security Council both expressed the United States’ support for the ICC’s 
decision and general accountability in Darfur.  However, Scott Gration, the 
U.S. special envoy to Sudan at the time, said that the ICC decision would 
make the process of conflict resolution in Darfur and Southern Sudan “more 
difficult.”41  China established a neutral position on the new genocide 
charges.  Jean Ping, the chairman of the Commission of the African Union, 
criticized the genocide charges against Bashir, noting the potentially 
damaging effects of the ICC’s decision on the “democratic transformation 
of the Sudan.”42  The Gulf Cooperation Council expressed similar concern 
about the status of the peace process in the aftermath of the ICC’s decision.  
Since the July 12 decision, the African Union has repeatedly described the 
genocide charges as damaging to the peace process in Sudan and a 
demonstration of the Prosecutor’s anti-African bias.  At the July 2010 AU 
summit in Kampala, the heads of states passed a draft resolution 
emphasizing non-cooperation with the ICC and condemning Moreno-
Ocampo’s conduct as prosecutor.43  According to the Sudan Tribune, South 
Africa, Botswana, and Uganda successfully advocated for a less forceful 
resolution on the ICC.  Where the original resolution had included a non-
cooperation clause, the new draft simply expressed concern over the 
prosecutor’s conduct.44  Repudiating the AU resolution, South Africa 
reiterated its support for the ICC and intent to arrest Bashir if he visits the 
country. 
In addition to the complexity of dealing with an indicted war criminal as 
president of a sovereign state, the ICC’s role in Darfur faces other 
challenges.  The court can only try a very small number of cases, and 
therefore will by necessity limit itself to only the highest level of 
perpetrators (the decision–makers and orchestrators of large–scale 
 40. For an excellent critical analysis of the ICC’s genocide charges against Bashir, 
please see, A. T. Cayley, Recent Steps of the ICC Prosecutor in the Darfur Situation: 
Prosecutor v. President: The Prosecutor’s Strategy in Seeking the Arrest of Sudanese 
President Al Bashir on Charges of Genocide, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 829 (2008). 
 41. U.S. Special Envoy Unhappy About ICC Genocide Ruling Against Sudanese 
President, SUDAN TRIB, July 14, 2010, http://www.sudantribune.com/U-S-special-envoy-
unhappy-about,35657. 
 42. African Union Chief Criticizes Genocide Charges Against Sudan President,
SUDAN TRIB., July 18, 2010, http://www.sudantribune.com/African-Union-chief-
criticizes,35693. 
 43. President Bashir did not attend the summit. 
 44. African Union Moves Aggressively to Shield Bashir from Prosecution, SUDAN 
TRIB., July 29, 2010, http://www.sudantribune.com/African-Union-moves-
aggressively,35786. 
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atrocities).45  In addition, trials are a time–intensive process, taking years to 
complete, delaying justice to a significant degree.46  Another critique of the 
court is that The Hague is significantly remote from Darfur, geographically, 
politically, and emotionally, that justice in the Hague will not be tangible 
for the very destitute people in Darfur for whom an old newspaper is a 
luxury.47 Many advocates of justice see the court as a side–show to real 
justice, which they say must be conducted closer to the scene of the crime.  
Despite the inherent challenges, with the considerable amount of 
international buy–in and State commitment to the ICC, it seems likely that 
the ICC prosecutions of President Bashir and other Sudanese defendants 
will continue, despite calls for the court to withdraw or defer its indictment 
and arrest warrant of Bashir under Article 16 of the Rome Statute.48  Neither 
the UN Security Council nor Chief Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo has shown 
 45. See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY 
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS ATROCITIES 31 (1998) (discussing case selectivity and 
international criminal courts). 
 46. Since the ICC has not yet conducted any trial proceedings, we can look to the ad 
hoc tribunals for an example of the time–frames involved in an international criminal trial.  
As one example, the Slobodan Milošević trial had taken a total of five years when Milošević 
died in custody in the Hague.  Prosecutor v. Milošević, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Public 
Transcript of Hearing, (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 14, 2006), 
available at http://www.icty.org (follow “Legal Library” hyperlink; then follow “ICTY 
Court Records” hyperlink; then register your email/sign in; then from the drop down menu 
select “English” in the language box; then select “Milosevic Slobodon” for name of the 
accused; then select “transcripts” for type of document; then select “14/03/2006” as the date 
to search; then click search).  As another example, Colonel Theoneste Bagosora’s trial in
front of the ICTR took over a decade from initial appearance in front of the court in 1997 to 
his conviction on December 18, 2008.  See Sukhdey Chhatbar,  Planner of Rwandan 
Massacres Convicted of Genocide, NY DAILY NEWS (Dec. 18, 2008), 
www.nydailynews.com/news/national. 
 47. For a discussion of the limitations of physically distant criminal justice systems, 
see, E. NEUFFER, KEY TO MY NEIGHBOR’S HOUSE: SEEKING JUSTICE IN BOSNIA AND RWANDA 
266 (2001). Neuffer’s example of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which 
was based in Arusha, Tanzania, and justice in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide is 
certainly applicable in the context of Darfur. 
 48. Such calls have been made by members of AU, the Arab League, the greater 
international community, and the United States activist community.  Scholar and Sudan 
expert John Prendergast and activist–actor George Clooney published an opinion piece in an 
early June 2010 issue of USA Today, in which they argued for the inclusion of Article 16 
within a set of policy incentives towards Sudan.  George Clooney & John Prendergast, U.S. 
Must Help Stop Sudan’s Slow-Motion War, USA TODAY, June 8, 2010, at 8, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/forum/2010-06-09-column09_ST1_N.htm.  Under 
the power of Article 16, “[n]o investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded 
with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution 
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to 
that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.”  Rome 
Statute, supra note 23, art. 16.  As per Article 16, the Security Council could adopt a 
resolution under the power of Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter (Chapter 7), 
declaring a halt to the Bashir prosecution as a means to restore international peace and 
security. 
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any inclination to deviate from the present course.  In addition, Sudan’s 
president Bashir has shown no inclination to accept the court has any 
jurisdiction over crimes in Darfur, and in fact has recently boldly flaunted 
the risk of arrest by traveling to several African countries.49  Thus, barring a 
dramatic change in course, international justice will continue to be part of 
the equation in the fight against impunity in Sudan.  However, international 
trials, on their own, cannot deliver justice and reconciliation in Darfur.  In 
order to achieve the tripartite goals of truth, justice, and reconciliation, there 
is a need for the establishment and implementation of additional tiers of 
Sudanese truth and justice mechanisms that are complementary to the ICC.  
The following pages will discuss these Sudanese justice and dispute 
resolution mechanisms and will assess their ability to seek peace and justice 
in the region.  These domestic mechanisms will be assessed from the 
perspective of the humanitarian and legal concerns of the international 
community, who will surely keep a watchful eye on any domestic justice 
proceedings for due process and other human rights standards.  Without the 
 49. The indictment, both initial and amended, has not halted President Bashir’s 
ability to conduct international relations.  He began the year in talks with Saudi Arabian King 
Abdullah bin Abdelaziz, during which the two heads of state discussed agricultural 
cooperation and food security.  He traveled to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in January for the 
African Union summit.  There, he met with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, as well as 
Chadian President Ibris Deby.  On July 4, 2010, he arrived in Addis Ababa for an 
extraordinary summit on Somalia of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD).  He met with IGAD heads of states on the sidelines of the summit to discuss 
bilateral and regional relations. 
President Bashir has also traveled since the ICC released its reconsideration of the 
indictment on July 12.  He traveled to the Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CENSAD) 
meeting in N’djamena, Chad in late July.  Chad assured President Bashir that he would not 
face arrest while in the country, and did not effectuate any arrest.  On August 3, President 
Bashir departed for a two–day visit with Libyan President Muammar al-Qaddafi, where the 
two leaders discussed bilateral ties.  On August 27, 2010, he traveled to Kenya and attended 
a highly public political celebration commemorating the recent national constitutional 
referendum, but Kenyan authorities declined to arrest him. 
However, President Bashir’s ability to affect international relations with the Republic of 
South Africa has been significantly affected.  In early June, South African Foreign Minister 
Maite Nkoana-Mashabane stated South Africa’s intent to adhere to its Rome Statute 
obligations and arrest President Bashir, were he to visit South Africa.  President Jacob Zuma 
had previously invited President Bashir, along with other African leaders, to attend the FIFA 
World Cup Finals.  
Also, President Bashir’s ability to travel outside the region has been significantly 
impacted.  In March, French President Nicolas Sarkozy personally invited Bashir to the 25th 
France-Africa summit in Nice, only to later withdraw his invitation.  Egypt cancelled its 
original hosting of the summit in December 2009, after France insisted that President Bashir 
be excluded.  Sudan will still participate in the France-Africa summit next May, but will send 
a high–level delegation in the president’s stead.  In a March interview with the German 
magazine Der Spiegel, President Bashir indicated his intention to visit Venezuela, an ICC 
state party, after receiving a personal invitation from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.  
According to the SUDAN TRIBUNE, the Brazilian government is “preparing for the possibility 
of Bashir’s plane passing through its airspace on its way to Venezuela and having to 
intercept it and take him into custody.”
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combined international, domestic, and regional efforts of all interested 
parties, justice and peace for Darfur will remain unrealized goals. 
III. THE HYBRID COURT FOR CRIMES IN DARFUR
Recognizing the limitations of international courts, advocates for justice 
continue searching for other mechanisms for accountability.  The October 
2009 report of the African Union High–Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), led 
by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, recommended the 
establishment of a hybrid court for Sudan, which would rely on national and
international administrators, as well as a “fusion of domestic and 
internationally recognised criminal justice procedures,” to investigate and
prosecute crimes in Darfur.50  The panel recommended the Hybrid Court for 
Crimes in Darfur as a complementary and intermediary tier between the 
domestic Sudanese judicial system, which confronts low confidence levels 
among the Sudanese population, traditional forms of Sudanese justice and 
dispute resolution (see infra), and the International Criminal Court.51
Sudan’s Interim National Constitution, which came into force in 2005, 
provides for the inclusion of ratified international human rights treaties in 
the Sudanese Bill of Rights.  However, as the interim constitution came into 
force in 2005, the Sudanese criminal justice system’s temporal jurisdiction 
does not extend to crimes committed in Darfur between 2003 and 2004.52
The establishment of a Hybrid Court for Crimes in Darfur could provide for 
the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed during that period.53
Such a hybrid court, as is clear in the Mbeki report, can provide a 
necessary link between strict international and domestic justice, and 
increase accessibility and provide transparency of the court proceedings to 
ordinary citizens.  Surely, the example of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
has not been without its challenges, and the Hybrid Court for Crimes in 
Darfur would need to consider such lessons learned, but another level of 
justice, more accessible and comprehensible to the people of Sudan, could 
only improve the prospects for peace in the nation.  However, given that 
Bashir remains the president of Sudan, and therefore controls the Sudanese 
 50. African Union [AU], Report of the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur 
(AIPD), at 64, PSC/AHG/2(CCVII) (Oct. 29 2009) [hereinafter Report of the African Union,
available at http://blogs.ssrc.org/sudan/wp-content/uploads/2009/10/AUPD-Report-Final-
October-2009.pdf. 
 51. Id. at 66. 
 52. Id. at 58-59. 
 53. Antonio Cassese’s Report on the Special Court for Sierra Leone provides another 
example of the potential and possibilities of the hybrid court, specifically the community 
outreach provisions of the court structure.  Cassese’s full report is available at A. Cassese, 
Report on the Special Court for Sierra Leone, SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, (2006), 
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=VTDHyrHasLc=&. 
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judiciary, it seems unlikely a hybrid court could function with the 
independence needed for true justice.    
IV. TRADITIONAL MECHANISMS FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT AND 
RECONCILIATION
Yet even this hybrid mechanism could remain far removed from the lives 
of average Darfurians.  The search continues for mechanisms to bring 
justice and accountability even closer to home.  Traditional mechanisms of 
conflict resolution and customary law have been performed by traditional 
leaders and used for resolving conflict in Sudan for generations.  In Sudan, 
“[c]onflict itself, when it occurs, and its containment and settlement, are 
seen as a collective responsibility, drawing the participation of leaders and 
members of the community to participate. Most importantly, the resolution 
of conflict may take the form of forgiveness and reconciliation instead of 
punishment.”54
The British colonial administration in Sudan created a structure utilizing 
the traditional tribal chiefs and assigning them specific tasks.  This so-called 
“Native Administration” required chiefs to:
• assure good management of tribal and local community affairs
• maintain security
• allocate land for agriculture and grazing (under the hakura system)
• settle conflicts over land tenure 
• provide communication, at local council and provincial and state levels 
• collect taxes and other levies
• mobilise communities, and
• chair tribal/sub-tribal local courts (judiyya).55
This basic structure remained in place until the Nimeiry regime of the 
early 1970’s replaced the Native Administration with a new system.  
Some say this reorganisation was the prime factor in triggering tribal 
conflicts on a wider scale in Darfur, as it meant that a locality belonging to 
one tribe could be controlled by another.  Up to 16 different rural council 
border disputes and conflicts occurred in southern Darfur alone soon after 
it was implemented . . . .56
 54. Khalid Ali El Amin, Tribal Conferences and Conflict Resolution Experiences 
Under British and Sudanese Rule 7 (House of Nationalities Draft, 2005), available at 
http://www.houseofnationalities.org/contribution%20by%20Khalid%20alAmin%20on%20th
e%20Tribal%20Conferences%20in%20Sudan%20April%2016%202005.asp. 
 55. Young, supra note 6, at 29.  Authors’ Note: This term judiyya refers to a key 
mediator (called ajaweed) role played by the tribal chiefs; see infra Section V.  See infra text 
accompanying note 60.  
 56. Id. at 29.  
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Since then, the Native Administration system has been changed several 
other times.  Prime Minister Sadiq al Mahdi reinstated it in 1987, only to 
have it significantly modified after the 1989 coup in which President Bashir 
and the National Islamic Front came to power.57
One of the major underlying root causes of the conflict relates to the 
Native Administration and their traditional control of land.  The hakura, or 
land grant system, was administered by the Native Administration, and the 
allocation of this land and land usage disputes became their responsibility 
although government frequently intervened.  The hakura system means that 
some tribes have a dar, or homeland, while others do not.58  The landless 
tribes that joined the Janjaweed were told that they would be given land if 
they fought on behalf of the government.59 Yet the traditional leaders who 
would adjudicate disputes over land tenure and access are the same leaders 
who have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.  
Despite changes to the Native Administration system and the roles of 
traditional leaders, these men have continued to play a role in resolving 
conflicts.  “The basis of reconciliation systems in Darfur is judiyya, a 
grassroots process whereby belligerents agree to mediation by wise and 
respected men—the ajwadi (plural: ajaweed)—consider well versed in 
traditional rules for ending disputes.”60  These traditional conflict resolution 
mechanisms have also been disrupted and face many challenges.61  The 
payment of blood money, or diya, is a crucial conflict resolution technique 
in Darfur.  It constitutes both a form of accountability as well as reparations 
(reparations meaning to repair the social fabric damaged by conflict).  It is 
part of a process through which traditional leaders come together to discuss 
a situation, assess individual or collective guilt, and come to consensus on 
the amount of diya to be paid and by whom.  According to customary law, 
the diya is reserved for certain crimes, including cases of unintentional 
killing.  In cases where a single perpetrator cannot be determined or there is 
group accountability, the payment becomes a collective responsibility.  This 
payment, called “dusty diya” because it settles over the entire village like 
dust, serves a critical reconciliatory function.  The village comes together to 
gather the resources to pay the diya (which also plays a deterrent function: 
 57. Id. at 30. 
 58. See id. at 29-30 for an explanation of the relationship between the hakura system, 
changes to the native administration, and conflict.  
 59. E. Rubin, If Not Peace, Then Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2006), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C02E1D61430F931A35757C0A9609C8B6
3&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=4 (providing that “[u]neducated, destitute and landless, they 
are motivated mainly by promises made by Sudanese government officials of land and 
loot.”).
 60. MAMDANI, supra note 13, at 288-89. 
 61. See Rift Valley Institute report, Local Peace Processes in Sudan: A Baseline 
Study accessed at http://www.riftvalley.net/documents/Local_Peace_Processes_in_Sudan_-
_May_2006.pdf “page 88 for details on the distinction between locally run judiyya processes 
and government-run judiyya processes.  
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cows are valuable commodities, and for an entire village to come up with 
sufficient numbers of cows or the money to buy them as compensation is a 
tremendous collective gesture of the intention not to let this happen again).62
Environmental stresses (including periodic drought) and pressures related to 
the conflict have caused large numbers of cow deaths, which put further 
pressure on the diya payments.63
These traditional systems have broken down when the government 
intruded in the tribal system.  The government manipulated the selection of 
tribal leaders, circumventing the traditional selection by consensus.  In the 
1990’s:  
the government introduced ‘emirates,’ or principalities, in every dar,64
appointing its own supporters as emirs and essentially creating a parallel 
Native Administration.  As one source explained, the objective behind 
appointing ‘princes’ is to weaken the structure of the Native 
Administration because the regime failed to mobilise [its] support and 
loyalty.65
The government has also “encouraged” tribal leaders to pay the diya in 
cases of intentional killing or murder that should legitimately be referred to 
the formal justice sector.  In cases that qualify for diya, the government has 
also at times paid the diya on behalf of some tribes and some villages.  
Although the government’s intentions could be well–meaning to help stop 
disputes from escalating, the fact that killing without having to pay diya
amounts to killing with impunity is an important factor in the failure to 
restrain acts of violence and revenge.  
Given the upheaval within the Native Administration structure and 
challenges to their traditional mechanisms for resolving conflict, the 
question then becomes whether these traditional leaders can play a role in 
processes geared toward truth, justice and accountability.  As a starting 
point, the High Level Panel on Darfur has called for, along with the 
aforementioned hybrid court, a truth and reconciliation commission for 
Darfur.66
 62. Interview by Jacqueline Wilson, Darfur (Mar. 2006) [hereinafter Wilson 
Interview]. 
 63. Young, supra note 6, at 5. 
 64. The “dar” (pl. diyaar) in the Arabic language has numerous meaning such as the 
halting place (mahallu), the house, abode, residence and the land (balad).  See Clarifying the 
Meaning of Dar al-Kufr and Dar al-Islam, KHILAFAH (Mar. 28, 2007), 
http://www.khilafah.com/index.php/the-khilafah/foreign-policy/225-clarifying-the-meaning-
of-dar-al-kufr-a-dar-al-islam. 
 65. Young, supra note 6, at 30. 
 66. AU: Back Mbeki Panel Call for Darfur Prosecutions, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
(Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/10/28/au-back-mbeki-panel-call-darfur-
prosecutions. 
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It was apparent to the Panel that there is still tremendous denial, on all 
sides, within Darfur and in Sudan, and unwillingness to concede 
culpability for the serious abuses which have so profoundly marked the 
people of Darfur.  It is not possible, for either Darfur or Sudan, to make a 
break with the past without a collective examination of the root causes and 
background to the war, the conduct of the war itself and its manifest 
consequences.  The Panel therefore believes that an independent Truth, 
Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC), mandated to probe and 
scrutinise all aspects of the relevant events between 2003-2009, would 
make an important contribution to healing the wounds of Darfur and the 
divisions in Sudan over Darfur.  To persuade perpetrators to make full and 
truthful confessions, or to accept responsibility for their crimes, there must 
be incentives for them to appear before the TJRC and disclose their 
actions, in order to disown the past and move forward.67
Whether the timing of a truth commission is yet at hand remains to be 
seen.  Perhaps it is too early, as the conflict is still ongoing and over two 
million people are displaced.  That being said, there is potential for some 
so–called Native Administration to play a positive role with respect to a 
mechanism to facilitate sharing the truth of what has happened in Darfur.  
Some would say that because of the power dynamics between the federal 
government and the Native Administration in general, that as long as the 
current federal government remains in power, it is highly unlikely that tribal 
leaders would be able to make a positive, and unbiased, contribution to 
peace.   
On the other hand, the situation remains fluid and could go in many 
directions. The ongoing changes in places like Egypt and Tunisia are being 
watched carefully by all sides in Sudan. There is a renewed sense that the 
final stages of implementating  the north/south Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, the January, 2011 vote for secession by the south and 
impending independence of Southern Sudan expected in July, 2011,,  recent 
calls by opposition figures for constitutional reform, and the lack of 
progress from peace talks in Doha, Qatar, are all factors which could 
eventually result in a transformed Sudanese government, which could find a 
way to make use of tribal leaders who maintain legitimacy with their 
communities to help facilitate justice and reconciliation.68  Most 
importantly, a truth commission for Darfur must not be government–run or 
sponsored.  Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s leadership of South Africa’s Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission could be a positive example for Darfur—
and could provide a model for establishing a role for some of the still-
 67. Report of the African Union, supra note 50, at 73. 
 68. For example, Ibrahim Musa Madibo, Nazir (paramount chief) of the Baggara 
(cattle-herding) Rezeigat tribe, has resisted government attempts at manipulation and 
remains a respected tribal leader.  Greater details of the history of the conflict are available in 
Flint, supra note 13; De Waal, supra note 13. 
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respected tribal chiefs in addition to respected individuals.  In order to be 
successful, however, this process should be largely run by local 
community–level councils.  Local ownership will allow community leaders 
to regain their pride, rebuild relationships, and more accurately reflect the 
will of the people with respect to justice and accountability.  
Historically, as evidenced by its negative reactions to the gacaca process 
in Rwanda, the West has given little credence to African solutions to 
African conflicts.69  However, the overall success of the gacaca process, in 
that mass violence has not erupted in Rwanda,70 as well as the success of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa in supporting the 
peaceful transition from an apartheid regime to a democratic system of 
governance, has demonstrated to the West the merit of African solutions to 
African problems.71  Thus, it remains possible that the ICC, and the UN as a 
whole, would welcome any Sudanese alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism that is actually designed to heal the nation, instead of simply 
shield alleged perpetrators from international or domestic legal scrutiny.  
As stated earlier, such a truth and reconciliation process in Sudan is far 
from a reality, and might not be able to operate without regime change in 
Khartoum.  However, if the will of the people of Sudan, including women, 
is expressed in a domestic dispute resolution process, the international 
community will embrace such a process as a reflection of the reality that 
domestic solutions are preferable to external solutions that may lack 
adequate context and cultural competence.  So, whether Sudan opts for a 
return to traditional Native Administrations, a return to traditional forms 
such as  judiyya and/or diya, or a novel, hybrid approach to truth and 
reconciliation in Darfur, the international community should welcome its 
appearance, as long as the chosen process is reflective of the will of the 
people of Darfur specifically, and the people of Sudan in general.  
V. RECONCILIATION
Reconciliation, in the sense of the word as used in a context of 
transforming relationships from a past of conflict and atrocities to a shared 
future, possibly involving truth–telling, forgiveness, and a symbolic ritual to 
 69. Raper, supra note 8, at 34-35. 
 70. While the performance of the gacaca courts are not, of course, solely responsible 
for the relative stability of the Third Republic of Rwanda since the 1994 genocide, the 
gacaca courts have released thousands of genocidaires back into society without a return to 
significant numbers of revenge killings or the mass violence attendant to the genocide.  Such 
a return to violence was envisaged by many in Rwanda and the international community.  
See Raper, supra note 8, at 2 n.5 (discussing the return to societal violence upon release of 
prisoners from the gacaca jurisdictions). 
 71. This is not to say that the South African TRC does not have its problems.  The 
issues of reparations and land redistribution remain contentious, and numerous legal hurdles 
remain.  In that the transition from an apartheid regime to a post-apartheid regime did not 
result in mass atrocities, the South African TRC can be considered a success.  
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bring closure and perhaps memorialize lost loved ones—might be 
considered a foreign concept in Darfurian society.  The government has 
conducted reconciliation conferences, but one gets the sense that the 
expectation is that communities will be “reconciled” after a single day of 
meetings and dancing, whereas reconciliation can often be a gradual process 
that happens over time.  The agreement and payment of diya is related to the 
concept of reconciliation in that it includes a sense of bringing closure and 
stopping the cycle of revenge, and an attempt to leave the past behind.  The 
concept requires greater understanding in terms of the extent to which it 
creates a sustainably transformed relationship between aggrieved parties.  
The aforementioned judiyya could prove useful in healing the 
relationships between the tribes.  “Since their introduction by the British in 
the 1920’s and to the present day, this tribal forum, whether judiyya or other 
similar process of consensus building, has been adopted as a mechanism to 
achieve inter-tribal peace.”72  These conferences have been administered 
differently depending upon leadership, and their format makes a tremendous 
difference in the outcome.  Under the British, the conferences were 
convened by a council of notables comprised of tribal leaders, religious 
leaders, and other wise men, but the council was no more than about sixteen 
men.  British government officials sometimes attended the conferences, but 
their role was to offer support and also to help assure any agreement would 
be implemented and respected.  During the conferences, the notables took 
several days for intense consultation with their lower ranking tribal leaders, 
and often with community members interested in or with knowledge of the 
situation, in order to gain a consensus outcome that would allow all parties 
to the conflict to achieve their interests as much as possible.73
This traditional form of tribal conference is contrasted with the way the 
present–day government reconciliation conferences have been conducted, 
when the participants often number over 100.74  Due in part to the large 
number of attendees, it is impossible to reach consensus, so the participants 
are broken into committees, each to handle a specific topic.  The final 
agreement is a composite of the outcomes of each of these committees—and 
does not represent true consensus.  This means that agreements are not 
implemented, and eventually the conflict revives—requiring a next 
conference to respond to the conflict.  In addition, in some of these 
conferences, rather than playing a role of neutral guarantor, the government 
takes the side of one or another participant, a flagrant violation of the 
standards for judiyya and a disruption of the entire conference process.75
Therefore these conferences “have as a consequence been turned from an 
adapted form of an indigenous conflict resolution mechanism that functions 
 72. El Amin, supra note 54.
 73. Id. at 1-8. 
 74. Id.
 75. Id.
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bottom-up into a semi-formal governmental ad hoc organisation that 
functions top-down.”76  For all of these reasons, any such mechanisms 
would careful preparation and management in order to be successful.  
Even so, the traditional process of judiyya conducted by wise community 
leaders seems to hold great promise for future application in Darfur.77
However, where the tribal leaders have become biased, or where the 
government has intervened in or controlled the process—and are guarding 
against these future outcomes in new cases—are situations which present an 
ongoing challenge.  Once again, the judiyya process would be virtually 
impossible to make effective if there is no transformation in the relationship 
between the federal government and the local leadership.  In addition, the 
process is not a community–level process, leaving women and youth, for 
example, to have been “reconciled” by others on their behalf.  The concept 
of reconciliation in Darfur likely requires a process uniquely suited to the 
experiences of the people of Darfur.  
VI. REPARATIONS
Historical references indicate the important role played by tribal leaders 
with respect to restoring a balance of resources after conflict.  In the 1901 
battles in Darfur, victims claimed, “we are unjustly oppressed and appeal to 
you, oh promoter of justice, to return to us what has been looted.”78  In 
addition to discovering the truth, the question of reparations, of some sort of 
compensation, financial or otherwise to “make the victims whole” is 
challenging in the context of Darfur.  
There seems to be consensus that the janjaweed were motivated by the 
guarantee of keeping looted goods.79  In addition to looted goods, there is 
the important issue of restoring livestock.  According to the 2005 Tufts 
University study, Darfur: Livelihoods Under Siege, those who have had 
livestock stolen are demanding government compensation, although there 
does not seem to be any mechanism or process for providing this remedy.80
 76. Id.
 77. Similar to the growing Western acceptance of the traditional Rwandan dispute 
resolution mechanism of gacaca, judiyya, with its significant roots in Sudanese legal history, 
will be accepted and embraced by the international community.  Judiyya will be embraced 
especially if it is inclusive of the concerns of all Sudanese, regardless of geography, gender, 
and religion.  Formal justice mechanisms, whether international or domestic, can only 
administer limited numbers of trials, and often do not foster considerable societal 
reconciliation.  Consequently, the vast majority of reconciliation in a post-conflict society 
must be meted out by alternative forums.  With its grounding throughout Sudan, judiyya
seems best able to address the concerns and viewpoints of all parties to the conflict in Darfur.  
See MAMDAMI, supra note 13, at 288-91, for a further discussion of judiyya’s historical 
origins in Darfur. 
 78. THEOBALD, supra note 2, at 48. 
 79. See Flint, supra note 13.   
 80. See Young, supra note 7. 
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The study gives four reasons why restocking with donor funds would be 
problematic:  
First, the scale of the restocking programme will be unprecedented, 
involving more than 250,000 households, each requiring a foundation 
stock of some 20 sheep and goats.  Funding and organisational capacity 
may not be available on this scale.  Second, the fact of donors sponsoring 
restocking would send the wrong signal to the perpetrators.  During 
restocking, there is a danger that donors may inadvertently buy stolen 
animals for distribution (even, perhaps, to their rightful owners), thereby 
rewarding those who looted them.  This may in turn encourage further 
looting.  Third, an externally funded process of restocking would not allow 
for reconciliation processes to occur between the various parties through 
resolution of the livestock issue.  Fourth, replenishing looted and lost 
assets will not solve the issues of mobility and safe access to trade and 
migration routes, which are an essential part of the livestock livelihood 
system for all groups.81
Further, even if the perpetrators can be asked to pay reparations, they may 
not have the resources to do so.  The ajaweed role performing the judiyya
function may provide the solution to this issue, as this function can also be 
used to determine reparations.  Just as a council of leaders can come to 
consensus on an issue of punishment or diya/blood money, so too could 
they use this technique to compensate those whose goods or livestock were 
gone.  This issue will not be an easy one, however, as noted in the previous 
caveats on group size and government intervention.  In addition, the process 
is different when perpetrators pay reparations from their own stocks versus 
outsiders or government paying it on their behalf.  That being said, the issue 
demands attention.  “Conflict and peoples’ livelihoods are inextricably 
linked.  Livelihoods are integral to the causes of the conflict and the impact 
it has had, and therefore will be central to any lasting solutions to the 
conflict.”82  The conflict will start to look much different to the displaced 
when they are back to their villages in time for a planting season, the annual 
Darfurian time of rebirth.83
 81. Id. at 110. 
 82. Id. at 109. 
 83. Reparations to victims are also a significant part of the justice of the ICC.  See
Rome Statute, supra note 23, art. 75(1-2) (“The Court shall establish principles relating to 
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation. On this basis, in its decision the Court may, either upon request or on its own 
motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss and 
injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state the principles on which it is acting.  The 
Court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate 
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation.”).  To assist in the administration of reparations, Article 79 of the statute 
establishes a trust fund “for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court, and the families of such victims.” Id. art. 79. 
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VII. POTENTIAL SHORTCOMINGS OF THE USE OF TRADITIONAL 
MECHANISMS
Before closing, a word must be said about some shortcomings of these 
traditional mechanisms.  As already mentioned, the extent to which the 
ruling regime intervenes to prevent truth telling and justice which might 
hold themselves—among other parties—accountable, remains probably the 
most challenging hurdle.  There is a question about the extent to which there 
can be transitional justice without a transition in terms of governance.  But 
other significant challenges remain.  These councils are composed of wise 
men, which means there is a dearth of wise women present.  Despite the fact 
that it runs counter to tradition, there must be a way to involve women in 
the process.  One idea that has been promulgated is to create “sheikha” 
counsels, or groups of wise women who can perform the same kinds of 
functions as men but for women’s issues.  Particularly in Darfur, where 
eighty percent of the displaced are women and children, it is imperative that 
women have a voice in the solutions that will impact the rest of their lives.  
Another concern relates to the use of rape as a tool of war.  Prosecutions 
for rape in Darfur under customary law could be problematic under 
international law or by contemporary western standards.  According to 
Physicians for Human Rights, women who come forward to report rape are 
often themselves charged with adultery.84  In addition, there are other 
challenges related to requirements of shari’a law.  “Because of extremely 
high levels of proof required (under customary law)—4 male or 8 female 
witnesses—rape is extremely difficult to prosecute in Sudan.”85  A 
Darfurian expert on customary law has stated that the traditional solution for 
rape cases is for the victim to marry the rapist or into the rapist’s family,
thereby circumventing the social norms that would ostracize the woman 
completely were she to be tried for adultery.86  A locally–owned process, 
one that could accommodate public issues yet keep such sensitive other 
issues private, is a requirement in a context such as Darfur, where the status 
of women is compromised by their historic lack of participation in local 
justice systems.87  Clearly this type of issue will require all the creativity 
that Darfurians, men and women, can muster. 
Finally, the sheer scope of the conflict in Darfur means that any efforts at 
truth, justice, accountability, compensation, reparations or reconciliation 
will be extremely challenging.  The conflict has affected all tribes. Few 
geographic localities remain untouched.  Any processes will need to 
 84. Darfur Survival Campaign: Darfur Fact Sheet, PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS.,
http://www.physiciansforhumanrights.org/students/darfuraction/darfur-fact-sheet.pdf. 
 85. Id.
 86. Wilson Interview, supra note 61. 
 87. Raper, supra note 8, at 53. 
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accommodate millions of victims who have experienced all variety of 
losses.  
CONCLUSION
Given the unique nature of each country, each situation in which war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide can occur, there is no single 
formula that can be applied in every circumstance.  That said, the 
international community is developing a more robust toolkit with which to 
respond to these situations.  The ICC, with its burgeoning maturity, is 
attempting to tackle the issue of justice and reconciliation in Darfur, and 
only time will tell how successful it will be when faced with intransigence, 
obfuscation and impediments of the most creative kind.  As put in an 
address by Judge Philippe Kirsch, President of the ICC at the Third Session 
of the Assembly of States Parties in The Hague, “the investigation and 
prosecution of cases will not only require the active participation of those 
countries where the investigations take place, but will also call upon all 
states which may be able to assist by providing information, evidence, or 
other forms of cooperation.”88
At present, this cooperation is sorely lacking in Sudan, and a significant 
number of its neighbors, allies, and other member states of the UN.  This 
lack of a unified international response threatens the ability of the court to 
function in the interests of ending impunity in the wake of serious crimes of 
international concern.  Even if the ICC’s search for justice in Darfur is not
derailed by the intersection of law, diplomacy, and geo-strategic politics, the 
international community must be aware of the serious limitations on the 
capacity of the court to prosecute large numbers of cases, and therefore 
challenge the Sudanese jurisprudential community with filling the gap 
between international measures and impunity.  
This gap will be filled with some unique and culturally appropriate 
mechanism that meets the needs of the affected population to learn the truth, 
hold people accountable, forgive as they are able, reconcile if possible, but 
most certainly to choose a path of looking toward the future.  In a country 
where a responsible party remains in power and the traditional mechanisms 
of reconciliation have been manipulated, as is the case in Darfur, this 
challenge is all the more complex.  This Article has offered one possible set 
of options designed to achieve the goals of holding those responsible for 
directing atrocities accountable through international law, transform the 
 88. Philippe Kirsch, President of the ICC, Address to 3rd Sess. of the Assembly of 
States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Sept. 6, 2004) 
(transcript available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/KirschAddress_ASP06Sept04_as_ 
delivered.pdf). 
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Sudanese judiciary, and empower citizens to both learn the truth and 
practice justice in partnership with legitimate, trusted traditional leaders.89
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Even this relatively simple mix of solutions will be amazingly 
challenging to implement, and this process could take years from the time a 
comprehensive peace is reached in Darfur.  Even beyond justice, 
reconciliation is a process of transforming hearts, a process that can take 
generations.  For the displaced and abused citizens of Darfur, this process 
cannot start too soon. 
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